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Constraints to Linkages Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions in South Eastern Nigeria   Mecha. Uduma      Nwagbo. C      C. Arene Federal college  of education, Obudu department of agricultural science University of Nigeria Nsukka, department of agricultural science  Abstract  The study determined major constraints to linkages between formal and informal financial institutions in South Eastern Nigeria.  Multistage random sampling procedure was used to get 36 formal and 38 informal financial institutions for the study.  Two sets of structured questionnaire were employed to generate data.  The study was guided by one null hypothesis.  Data generated were analyzed using descriptive statistics and probit regression.  Formal financial institutions had 4 major constraints in linking with the informal viz: poor legal and regulatory systems, lack of confidence, problem of communication and poor capacity building in the informal sector.  Similarly the informal financial institutions’ major constraints in linking with the formal were: institutional rigidities, poor capacity building and inadequacies of regulatory systems.  Based on the constraints to linkages, the following recommendations were made; providing effective judicial system for protecting property rights and facilitating networking of all informal financial; institutions.  Acknowledgement This article forms part of the first author’s Ph.D Dissertation in the Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Nigeria.  The second and third authors are the dissertation supervisors.  Introduction  Business exploitation, expansion and modernization depend on capital investment, given good management. Most business people in developing nations are poor and so require credit. Providing credit to poor borrowers has remained a challenge; as credit markets in these regions are faced with the problem of enforcement and imperfect information among others (Seibel, 2001). Government intervention in the form of ownership of banks, regulation and subsidization of credit has equally failed to allocate credit to poor borrowers (Udry, 1994). Institutional problems such as the lending conditions which limit access of investors to credit facilities have not been adequately addressed (Vargese, 2005). The fragmented structures of financial institutions where formal and informal sectors operate almost independent of each other is inimical to the growth of a strong and sustainable financial system.   The formal financial institutions have extensive infrastructure and system, strong management capacity, access to funds, yet they are further removed from rural investors making obtaining adequate information and enforcing contracts imperfect and costly  (Bagachwa, 1995). In contrast, informal financial institution which operate close to rural borrowers possess enforcement mechanisms, have acceptable credit programmes, low cost of transaction ,cheap outreach and good information about borrowers, but they do not provide enough credit to investors, neither have they linked borrowers to the mainstream financial sector (Yaron, 1994). Linkage arrangement will help address the information asymmetries, resolve enforcement problems, reduce cost of transaction, improve financial service delivery and hence facilitates economic development. The study therefore seeks for linkages as strategy that will help expand formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sectors.   1.3 Objectives of the study  The broad objectives of this work is to examine the linkages between formal and informal financial institutions is South Eastern Nigeria.  The specific objectives of the study are to: 
(i) Determine major constraints to linkages between formal and informal financial institutions;  
(ii) Make recommendation for policy and further research based on findings.   1.4 Research Hypotheses  One null hypothesis was tested: The opinions of the formal and informal financial institutions on constraints to linkages are not statistically different. Methodology The study area The study area is Southern Nigeria. The area comprises, Abia, Amanbra, Ebonyi, Enugu and Imo State, 
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Southeastern Nigeria lies between latitude 40 50’N to 70 10’N and longitudes 60 40’E to 80 30’E.  Multi-Stage random sampling procedure was employed in selecting respondents for the study. Southeastern Nigeria is made up of 5 states and out of these 3 were randomly selected. Secondly, from each of the 3 selected sates, 3 Local Government Areas each were randomly selected. All informal financial institutions in each of the 3 LGAs were identified. 5 informal financial institutions were selected from each L.G.A; giving a total of 45 informal financial institutions for the study. Twelve formal financial institutions from each of the 3 states were enlisted and the bank managers/Accountants provided data for the study. Data Collection Secondary data were sourced from records of both the formal and informal financial institutions as well as from published sources.  Data Analysis The two objectives of the study were realized using factor analysis. Both mean score and exploratory factor (principal component) analysis were employed. First, to identify constraints to linkages as perceived by the respondents, a five point Likert scale rating with a decision mean of 3 was used.  Respondents mean score was obtained for each response item such that any response mean higher or equal to 3 will be regarded as a “constraint”. To group the identified constraints, principal component analysis with varimax rotation was used. The cut off point for factor loading was 0.40 that is’ 10% overlapping variance. Therefore, factor loading less than 0.40 or variable that loaded in more than one factor was discarded.  Principal Component Mode Specification  The principal component mode used in achieving objective 1 is given thus:  P1 = a11 X1 +          a12 X2+…  + a1k  Xk P2 = a21 X1 +          a22 X2+…  + a2k  Xk *   *  * * *  *  * *  *  *  * *  PK  = ak1 X1 +          ak2 X2+*  *    + ak k   Xk Where: P1, P2 … Pk:  = Principal component or major constraints to linkages  a2  - ak   = Factor loadings or correlation coefficients  X1, X2 … Xk:  = Independent variables (constraints) to linkage between the financial institutions such as:  X1 =  Poor regulatory environment for protecting property rights  X2 = inadequate law that permit wide range of security interest  X3 = poor response of sectors to government reforms policies  X4 = poor implementation of regulatory policies by government  X5 = Inefficient second-tier regulatory authority X6 = non provision of forms legal status for formal sector X7 = poorly defined property right  X8 = lack of interest in linkages  X9 = Lack of permanence of the informal sector  X10 = Poor asset base of the informal sector  X11 = non availability of acceptable collateral.  X12 = Non provision of annual audited balance sheet  X13 = Irregular saving activities by the formal sector  X14 = Rules of viable sustainable financial system are not observed  X15 = Political instability  X16 = Identifying reliable auditing firms  X17 = poor reporting operations of the informal sector X18 = poor record keeping  X19 = poor information management system.  X20 = Poor registration of informal sector  X21 = Networking among informal sector not facilitated  X22 = Non provision of consultancy services to informal sector  X23 = Lack of organizational upgrading  X24 = Poor operational upgrading  X25 = Lack of Umbrella Organization (Union).  X26 = Low quality of administrative staff of informal sector  X27 = Low are of expansion of banks to rural areas  X28 = Poor adaptation of banks to socio-cultural environments of informal sector 
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X29 = Non adoption of the accounting system of informal financial institutions  X30 = low grading of informal financial sector  X31 = Poor business dealings with informal financial institutions.  Model for testing hypothesis  The null hypothesis was tested using Z-test.   The Z statistic used in testing hypothesis is calculated as:  
  Where:  Z = The value by which the statistical significance of the mean difference were judged.  X1  = Mean responses of operators of formal financial institutions as regards constraints and strategies to linkages.  X2  = Mean Responses of operators of informal financial institutions as regards constraints and strategies to linkages.  S12 =  Variance of constraints and strategies of operators of formal institutions.  S22 =  Variance of constraints and strategies of operators of informal institutions N1    = Number of operators of formal institutions N1  = Number of operators of informal institutions  Decision Rule:  Reject the null hypothesis if Zcal  < Ztab  Accept the null hypothesis if Zcal  < Ztab   (Olayemi, 1998). Result and Discussion Table 1.1 Mean and standard deviation of formal and informal and informal financial institutions on constraints to linkages.  S/N Possible Constraints   Formal Informal Decision 1 Poor regulatory environment for Protecting property rights 4.09(1.056) 3.53(1.370) A 2 Inadequate laws for collateral Security 3.74(1.163) 3.97(1.241) A 3 Poor response of sector to Government reforms policies 3.71(1.244) 3.42(1.287) A 4 Poor implementation of regulatory Policies by government. 3.71(1.142) 3.24(1.304) A 5 Ineffective second-tier regulatory Authority 3.50(1.237) 3.38(1.361) A 6 Non provision of form of legal status for the informal sector 3.65(1.098) 3.32(1.317) A 7 Poorly defined property right 3.74(1.109) 3.68(1.029) A 8 Lack of interest in Linkages 3.33(0.595) 3.63(0.589) A 9 Lack of permanence of the informal Sector 4.09(1.056) 3.53(1.370) A 10 Poor asset base of the informal Sector 3.76(1.251) 3.16(1.424) A 11 Non availability of acceptable Collateral 3.21 (1.200) 3.00(1.336) A 12 Non provision of annual audited Balance sheet 3.59(1.234) 3.08(1.282) A 13 Irregular saving activities by the Informal 4.08(1.056) 3.53(1.370) A 14 Rules of viable/sustainable financial System are not observed. 3.30 (1.223) 3.61(1.385) A 15 Political instability 3.90 (1.043) 3.50(1.466) A 16 Problem of identifying reliable auditing firms 3.74(1.136) 3.55(1.389) A 17 Poor reporting of operations of the Informal sector 3.70 (1.015) 3.16(1.191) A 18 Poor record keeping 3.85(1.034) 3.05(1.384) A 19 Poor information management System 3.76(1.232) 3.02(1.343) A 20 Poor registration of information Sector 3.59 ( 1.184) 3.01(1.394) A 21 Networking of informal sector 3.50 (1.108) 3.47(1.330) A Figures in brackets are standard deviation  A  = Agree D = Disagree Source: Field Survey Data, 2008.  The results (mean and standard deviation) of the opinion of the operators of formal and informal financial 
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sectors on constraints to linkages are shown in table1 above. Both operators (formal and informal) accepted all the 31 variables as constraints to linkages. In general, two (2) constraint items: poor regulatory environment for protecting property rights and lack of permanence of the informal sectors scored the highest means of 4.09 each among the formal sector operators, while the lowest mean (3.21) was recorded in their opinion to the statement that non availability of acceptable collateral was constraint to linkage with the informal financial sector. For the informal operators, the item (27) which states that low rate of expansion of bank branches to the rural areas constitutes constraint to linkage with the formal sector had the highest mean (4.03), while item (11) which states that non availability of acceptable collateral recorded the lowest mean (3.21). Major Constraints to Linkages between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions For policy relevance, the 31 individual constraints agreed upon by both financial institutions as constraints, were further grouped into major constraints using the exploratory factor analysis (principal components). The result of the rotated component matrix showing the extract components based on the responses of these institutions are shown in table 1.2 and 1.3 below. Table 1.2: Results of varimax rotated constraints to linkages by formal financial institutions. Factor 1: Inadequacies of Regulatory Framework Factor 2: Communication problems Factor 3 Lack of confidence Factor 4. poor capacity building Item No Loading Item No Loading Item No Loading Item No Loading 1 785 23 .426 9 539 23 426 2 .791 24 .675 10 .636 24 675 3 .822 25 .830 11 .684 25 .830 4 .681 26 796 12 .770 26 .796 5 .722 21 .561 13 .708   6 .867   14 735   7 .775        Source: Computed Field Survey data, 2008.  Based on the clustering of loadings (component validity), the forma sector’s major constraints in linking with the informal sector were: inadequacies of regulatory framework (component  2), Lack of confidence (component 3) and poor capacity building (component 4). Extract of the various components and constraint items substantially loaded on them showed that component 1 had 7 items; component 2 had 5 items, component 3 had 6 items while component 4 recorded 4 items. The loading (eigen value)under inadequacies of regulatory framework  were: poor regulatory environment for protecting property right (.785), inadequate laws that permit a wider range of security interest (.791), poor response of sectors to government reform policies (.822), poor regulatory policy implementation by the government (.681), ineffective second-tier regulatory authority (.722), non-provision of form of legal status for the informal sector (.867) and poorly defined property rights (.775). Constraint items that loaded high under poor capacity building (component 4) include: lack of organizational upgrading. (.426), poor operational upgrading (.675), lack of umbrella organization (union) (.830) and low quality of administrative staff of informal sector (796). Table 1.3 Results of varimax rotated constraints to linkages by informal financial institutions.  Factor 1: Institutional Rigidity Factor 2: Poor Capacity Building Factor 3 Inadequacies of Regulatory Framework Item No Loading Item No Loading Item No Loading 27 .464 23 .770 1 .625 28 .654 24 .608 2 .584 29 .822 25 .830 3 .665 30  .794 26 .745  4 .724 31   .606   .461 5 .415 Source: Computed Field Survey data, 2008.  On the basis of component validity or clustering of loadings, the informal sector’s major constraints in linking with the formal were grouped into 3 principal components: Institutional rigidity (Component 1), Poor capacity building (component 2) and inadequacies of regulatory framework (component 3). Extract of the various components of the constraint items substantially loaded on them showed that components 1 and 3 had 5 items each, while component 2 had 4 items. 
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The loadings under institutional rigidities (component 1) were low rate of expansion of bank branches to rural areas (.464). Poor adaptation of banks to socio-cultural environment of the informal sector ( .654), non adoption of the accounting system of informal financial institutions (.464) and poor business dealings with informal financial institution (.606). The informal sector’s second major constraint in linking with the formal was again, their own problem of poor capacity building (component 2). The items that loaded were: Lack of (.745) and low quality of administrative staff of informal sector (.461). The loadings under inadequacies of regulatory system were: poor regulatory environment for protecting property rights (.625), inadequate laws that permit wider range of security interest (.584), poor response of sectors to government reform policies (.665), poor regulatory policy implementation by government (.724), and inefficient second-tier regulatory authority (.415). This finding is highly revealing as the informal sector accepted their own problems, confirming earlier reports that the formal sector do not have confidence in linking with the informal sector. In the absence of confidence on the informal  sector’s ability to repay loans, forma sector shy away from Linkages (Aryeetey, 1996). Difference between formal and informal Financial Institutions on Constraints to Linkages  In order to test hypothesis 2, the opinions of the operators of formal and informal financial institutions on constraints to linkages were compared using t-test of means. The result is presented in Table 4.3.  Table 1.3  Result of test of difference between formal and informal financial institutions on constraints to linkages.  S/N Constraints Formal Informal t-cal Decision 1 Poor regulatory environment for Protecting property rights 3.59(1.184) 3.00(1.394) 1.927 NS 2 Inadequate laws for collateral Security 3.74(1.163)  3.97(1.241) 0.812 NS 3 Poor response of sector to Government reforms policies 3.71(1.244) 3.42(1.287) 3.256 NS 4 Poor implementation of regulatory Policies by government. 3.71(1.142) 3.24(1.304) 1.630 NS 5 Ineffective second-tier regulatory Authority 3.50(1.237) 3.38(1.361)  NS 6 Non provision of form of legal status for the informal sector 3.50(1.237) 3.38(1.361) 0.389 NS 7 Poorly defined property right 3.74(1.109) 3.68(1.029) 0.233 NS 8 Lack of interest in Linkages 3.33(0.595) 3.63(0.589) 2.131 NS 9 Lack of permanence of the informal Sector 4.09(1.056)  3.53(1.370) 1.955 NS 10 Poor asset base of the informal Sector 3.76(1.251) 3.16(1.424) 1.890 NS 11 Non availability of acceptable Collateral 3.21 (1.200) 3.00(1.336) 0.703 A 12 Non provision of annual audited Balance sheet 3.59(1.234) 3.08(1.282) 1.719 A 13 Irregular saving activities by the Informal 4.09(1.056) 3.53(1.370) 1.955 A Source: Computed field survey data, 2008.  *Figures in brackets are standard deviation  * P < 0.05; df   = 72 (t = 1.951).  NS  = Not significant; P < 0.05  S = Significant; P < 0.05  The results (table 1.3) show significant difference between the opinion of operators of formal and informal financial institutions on. There were however, no significant different in the opinions of these operators on the other 24 constraint items. The hypothesis that there will be no significant difference in the opinions of operators of formal and informal financial institutions on these constraints to linkages was therefore upheld.  Conclusion and Recommendations The following policy recommendations based on the major constraints to linkages arise from the study:  1. The use of fiscal policy to provide incentives such  as tax relief on profits granted to banks that allocated credit through informal sectors which could be recovered by imposing higher taxes on banks that fail to do so.  2. Improving the ability of banks to reduce loan losses through the use of local sanction to enforce repayment.  
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3. Adoption of efficient second-tier regulating authority for all informal institution be adopted; changed with the duties of registration, supervision or regulation of all informal sectors.   Conclusion This study has determined the constraints in facilitating linkages between formal informal financial institutions in South Eastern Nigeria.  Results have shown that the financial industry has remained fragmented with little or no integration or overlaps due to distrust, poor legal/regulatory framework, poor capacity building, institutional rigidity, among other things. Since each of these sectors has its advantages and disadvantages, under separate existence, the industry cannot render sustainable services to the economy. In line with the nation’s financial sector reforms therefore, it is the conclusion of the study that policy that will promote overlaps or integration between these sectors be adopted.   References Bagachwa, M. S. D. (1995)  “Financial Integration and Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: A Study of Informal    Finance in Tanzania”.  Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 79, London: ODI. Seibel, H. D. (1999).  “Transforming Rural Finance in Africa”.   The role of AFRACA”.  NewsLetter, Nairobi,Kenya. Udry, C. (1994).  “Risk and Insurance in a Rural Credit Market; An Empirical Investigation inNorthern Nigeria”.  Review of Economic Studies 61 (3) No. 208, PP. 495 – 526. Argese, A. (2005)  “Bank – Money Lender Linkage as an alternative to bank competition in rural credit markets; Oxford Economic papers, 59 (2) 105 – 124. Yaron, I. (1994)  “What makes Rural Financial Institutions Successful”.  Research Observer 9 (1) PP 49 – 70.  World Bank, Washington, D. C.  
